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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hoak argued that his conviction must be reversed 
where the jury was permitted to hear numerous highly prejudicial "prior bad acts" which 
amounted to undue prejudice to the extent that any limiting instruction given was 
insufficient. In addition, Mr. Hoak asserted that the error committed by the district court 
was not harmless. The State responded, arguing that the district court did not error in 
allowing the jury to hear the highly prejudicial bad act evidence. Because the State 
concluded there was no error, it declined to present an argument that any error was 
harmless. Additionally, the State argued that the cases relied on by Mr. Hoak for the 
proposition that the district court's limiting instruction did not cure the taint from the 
improper bad act evidence, "illustrate [defense counsel's] misunderstanding of the law." 
(See Respondent's Brief, p.10.) The instant reply brief is necessary to address the 
arguments in and omissions from the Respondent's Brief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
The Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Hoak's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
Did the district court err by admitting testimony regarding prior bad acts of Mr. Hoak 
because their probative value, individually, or viewed cumulatively, was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Bv Admittinn Testimonv And Evidence Renardinq Prior Bad 
Acts Of Mr. Hoak Because Any Probative Value Was Substantiallv Outweiahed Bv The 
Danaer Of Unfair Preiudice 
A. Introduction 
The instant Reply Brief is necessary to address the arguments made in the 
Respondent's Brief that the case law does not support Mr. Hoak's contention that the 
limiting instruction given by the district court regarding the prior bad acts was not 
sufficient to remedy the prejudicial effect of the offered evidence. 
B. The District Court Erred By Admittinq Testimony And Evidence Reqardinn Prior 
Bad Acts Of Mr. Hoak Because Any Probative Value Was Substantially 
Outweiahed BV The Danger Of Unfair Preiudice 
1. The Given Limitinq Instruction Was Insufficient To Remedv The Preiudicial 
Effect Of The Offered Prior Bad Acts 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hoak argued that the given limiting instruction 
addressing the prior bad act evidence offered by the State was insufficient to cure the 
prejudicial effect of the offered evidence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.14-I6 (citing 
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8 (1 987) and U.S. v. Daniels, 770 F.2d I I I I (D.C. 
Cir. 1985).) In it's briefing, the State argued that "[tlhe cases Hoak relies on in support 
of his argument illustrate his misunderstanding of the law." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) 
The essence of the State's argument is that the court in Greer dealt only with whether a 
curative instruction given by the court was sufficient to remedy the improper admission 
of evidence. According to the State the Greer Court's analysis was strictly limited to 
curative instructions and does not apply to the use of limiting instructions, as in this 
case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) The State's argument merely addresses a 
distinction without a difference between Greer and the present case. In this case, 
Mr. Hoak is arguing that the district court improperly allowed the jury to hear prior bad 
act evidence, and any limiting instruction telling the jury it could only consider the 
evidence for a specific purpose could not cure the prejudicial effect of the offered 
evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) Likewise, a court will give a curative instruction 
when the jury was allowed to hear inadmissible evidence and the jury is told to 
disregard it. In either case, the question before the reviewing court is whether the jury 
would be able to follow the given instruction or whether there is an "overwhelming 
probability" the jury will disregard the given instruction. 
In fact, in U.S. V. Jones, 16 F.3d 487 (2" Cir. 1994), the second circuit employed 
the Greer "overwhelming probability" analysis in a case where the jury was allowed to 
hear prior bad act evidence that the defendant had a previous criminal conviction. Id. at 
492. In reversing the conviction, the Court observed that the given limiting instruction 
that the jury could not consider that the defendant was a convicted felon, was 
insufficient to cure prejudice suffered by Jones "from the admission of his criminal 
record." Id. at 492-493. 
Next, the State argues that Mr. Hoak's reliance U.S. v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 11 11 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), "is also inapplicable" because Daniels was a case dealing with an 
improper joinder where the jury was allowed to hear that Daniels was a felon. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) The State attempts to distinguish the instant case 
because "Hoak's case involves a single charge and does not involve the admission of 
prior bad act evidence not admissible as to that charge." (Respondent's Brief, pp.11- 
12.) The State's purported distinction is without merit. First of all, prior bad act 
evidence, which is allegations of bad conduct outside the time frame contained in the 
charging document, as here, is presumptively inadmissible. See State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 721-722, 23 P.3d 786, 795-796 (Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing that I.R.E. 
404(b) is a rule of exclusion, not inclusion); see generally State v. Grist, 2009 Opinion 
No. 14 (January 29, 2009). Additionally, whether dealing with joinder of two cases, or 
one just the introduction of evidence in one case, in either situation the first question is 
whether bad act evidence should be presented to the jury. If the appellate court 
answers that it was improper to present the evidence to the jury, in either case, the next 
question is whether the limiting instruction is sufficient to cure any improper 
consideration of the evidence by the jury, which, is the central question presented in the 
instant case. 
2. The Introduction Of The Prior Misconduct Evidence Was Not Harmless 
In its briefing, the State concludes that "[b]ecause there was no error in this case, 
there is no need to engage in a harmless error analysis." (Respondent's Brief, p.12, fn. 
1) In the event this Court finds error in the district court's ruling on the admissibility of 
the bad act evidence, Mr. Hoak asserts that the State has now implicitly conceded that 
is there was error, it cannot be harmless, as the State has been given the opportunity to 
address the issue and affirmatively waived it. See generally State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hoak respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for felony 
stalking with a persistent violator enhancement. 
DATED this 2"d day of April, 2009. 
Deputy State Appellate Public ~efendkr 
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